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INC. v. CAL. EMP. COM.

[24 C.2d

while the facts of reemployment differed as to each claimant,
the facts comprising the background of the controversies are
the same and the parties stipulated that the evidence relating
thereto presented in one case should apply to all. Moreover,
all the cases were consolidated for hearing before the commission, which rendered a uniform opinion for each of them,
and no benefit can result from now requiring petitioners to
amend their petition to present each claimant's case as a
separate cause of action.
The commission and claimants contend further that the
employers are not entitled to any relief because they have not
exhausted the remedy provided by section 41.1 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. This question is decided adversely
to them in Matson Terminals, Inc., v. California Employment
Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]. Likewise, the fact that
the benefits awarded claimants have already been paid cannot deprive petitioners of their remedy in this proceeding.
(Whitcomb Hotel, Inc., v. California Employment 00., post
p.753 [151 P.2d 233].)
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion.
In this case both the adjustment unit and the referee
denied benefits. Although the commission granted them, there
was not present the initial allowance of benefits followed by
affirmance by the referee as required by section 67 of the
California Unemployment Insurance Act as it read in 1939
(Stats. 1939, ch. 1085), hence, the benefits were not payable
regardless of an appeal.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 13, 1944. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
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WHITCOMB HOTEL, INC. (a Corporation) et aI., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION
et aI., Respondents; FERNANDO R. NIDOY et al.,
Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Statutes-Construction-Executive or Departmental Construction.-The construction of a statute by the officials charged
with its administration must be given great weight, for their
substantially contemporaneous expr.essions of opinion are
highly relevant and material evidence of the probable general
understanding of the times and of the opinions of men who
probably were active in drafting the statute.
[2] Id.-Construction-Executive or Departmental Construction.An administrative officer may not make a rule or regulation
that alters or enlarges the terms of a legislative enactment.
[8] Id.-Construction-Executive or Departmental Construction.An erroneous administrative construction does not govern the
interpretation of a statute, even though the statute is subsequently reenacted without change.
[4] Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Refusal to Accept
Suitable Employment. - The disqualification imposed on a
claimant by Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(b) (Stats.
1935, ch. 352, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act
8780d), for refusing without good cause to accept suitable
employment when offered to him, or failing to apply for such
employment when notified by the district public employment
office, is an absolute disquali:fl.catlOlI that necessarily extends
throughout the period of his unemployment entailed by his
refusal to accept suitable employment, and is terminated only
by his subsequent employment.
[5] Id. - Disqualification - Refusal to Accept Suitable Employment.'-One who refuses suitable employment without good
cause is not involuntarily unemployed through no fault of his
own. He has no claim to benefits either at the time of his refusal or at any subsequent time until he again brings himself
within the Unemployment Insurance. Act.
[1] See 23 Ca1.Jur. 776; 15 Am.Jur. 309.
[4] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part) ''Unemployment Reserves and Social Security."
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Statutes, § 180(2); [4-8] Unemployment Relief.
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[6] ld. - Disqualification - Refusal to Accept Suitable Employment.--Employment Commission Rule 56.1, which attempts to
create a limitation as to the time It person may be disqualified
for refusing cO accept suitable employment, conflicts with Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(b), and is void.
[7] ld.-Powers of Employment Commission':'-'Adoption of Rules.
-TIll' power given th(~ Employment Commission by the Unemployment Insurance Act, § 90, to adopt rules and regulations
is not a grant of legislative power, and in promulgating such
rules the commission may not alter or amend the statute
enlarge or impair its scope.
[8] ld.-Remedies of Employer - Mandamus. - Inasmuch as the
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 67, provides that in certain
cases payment of benefits shall be made irrespective of a subsequent appeal, the fact that such payment has been made
does not deprive an employer of the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel the vacation of an award of benefits
when he is entitlbd to such relief.
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that order. Nidoy had been employed as a dishwasher at the
Whitcomb Hotel, and Betty Anderson as a maid at the St.
Francis Hotel. Both lost their employment but were subsequently offered reemployment in their usual occupations at
the Whitcomb Hotel. These offers were made through the
district public employment office and were in keeping with
a policy adopted by the members of the Hotel Employers'
Association of San Francisco, to which this hotel belonged,
of offering available work to any former employees who
recently lost their work in the member hotels. The object
of this policy was to stabilize employment, improve working
conditions, and minimize the members' unemployment insurance contributions. Both claimants refused to accept the
proffered employment, whereupon the claims deputy of the
commission ruled that they were disqualified for benefits
under section 56 (b) of the California Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, ch. 352, as amended; Deering's Gen.
Laws, 1937, Act 8780d), on the ground that they had refused
to accept offers of suitable employment, but limited their
disqualification to four weeks in accord with the commission's
Rule 56.1. These decisions were - affirmed by the Appeals
Bureau of the commission. The commission, however, reversed
the rulings and awarded claimants benefits for the full period
-- of unemployment on the ground that under the collective
bargaining contract in effect between the hotels and the
unions, offers of employment could be made only through
the union.
In its return to the writ, the commission concedes that it
misinterpreted the collective bargaining contract, that the
agreement did not require all offers of. employment to be
made through the union, and that the claimants are therefore subject to disqualification for refusing an offer of suitable employment without good cause. It alleges, however,
that the maximum penalty for such refusal under the provisions of Rule 56.1, then in effect, was a four-week disqualification, and contends that it has on its own motion removed
all charges against the employers for such period.
The sole issue on the merits of the case involves the validity
of Rule 56.1, which limits to a specific period the disqualification imposed by section 56 (b) of the act. Section 56 of the
act, under which the claimants herein were admittedly dis-
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PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California
Employment COITI1'lli,<;sion to vacate an award of unemployment L)(~lldit::; 'mel to refrain from charr.;ing petitioners' ac(;Ollllt::; with benefits paid. Writ granted.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Gregory A. Harrison and
Richard Ernst for Petitioners.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney GeneI'al, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Forrest M. Hill, Gladstein, Grossman,
Margolis & Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein,
Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard
Gladstein for Respondents.
Clarence E. Todd and Charles P. Scully as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J.-In this proceeding the operators of the
Whitcomb Hotel and of the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco seek a writ of mandamus to compel the California
Employment Commission to set aside its order granting unemployment insurance benefits to two of their former employees, Fernando R. Nidoy and Betty Anderson, corespondents in this action, and to restrain the commission from
charging petitioners' accounts with benefits paid pursuant to
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qualified, provides that: "An individual is not eligible for
benefits for unemployment, and no such benefit shall be payable to him under any of the following conditions: . . . (b)
If without good cause he has refused to accept suitable employment when offered to him, or failed to apply for suitable
employment when notified by the District Public Employment Office." Rule 56.1, as adopted by the commission and
in effect at the time here in question, restated the statute and
in addition provided that: "In pursuance of its authority to
promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of
the Act, the Commission hereby provides that an individual
shall be disqualified from receiving benefits if it finds that
he has failed or refused, without good cause, either to apply
for available, suitable work when so directed by a public
employment office of the Department of Employment or to
accept suitable work when offered by any employing unit
or by any public employment office)f said Department. Such
disqualification shall continue for the week in which such
failure or refusal occurred, and for not more than three weeks
which immediately follow such week as determined by the
Commission according to the circumstances in each case."
The validity of this rule depends upon whether the commission was empowered to adopt it, and if so, whether the rule
is reasonable.
The commission contends that in adopting Rule 56.1 it exercised the power given it by section 90 of the act to adopt
"rules and regulations which to it seem necessary and suitable to carry out the provisions of this act" (2 Deering's
Gen. Laws, 1937. Act 8780d, § 90 (a) ). In its view section
56 (b) is ambiguous because it fails to specify a definitt'
period of disqualification. The commission contends that a
fixed period is essential to proper administration of the act
and that its construction of the section should be given great
weight by the court. It contends that in any event its interpretation of the act as embodied in Rule 56.1 received the
approval of the Legislature in 1939 by the reenactment of
section 56 (b) without change after Rule 56.1 was already in
effect.
[1] The construction of a statute by the officials charged
with its administration must be given great weight, for their
"substantially contemporaneous expressions of opinion are

'~----~--~---~~~-~.----~,-----.
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highly relevant and material evidence of the probable general understanding of the times and of the opinions of men
who probably were active in the drafting of the statute."
(White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 [62 S.Ct.
425, 86 L.Ed. 619]; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 375, 378 [51 S.Ct. 144, 75 L.Ed. 397]; Riley v.
Thompson, 193 Cal. 773, 778 [227 P. 772] ; County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie, 19 Ca1.2d 634, 643 [122 P.2d 526] ; County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 17 Ca1.2d 707, 712 [112 P.2d
10] ; see, Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem,
54 Harv.L.Rev. 398, 405; 27 Cal.L.Rev. 578; 23 Cal.Jur.
776.) When an administrative interpretation is of long standing and has remained uniform, it is likely that numerous
transactions have been entered into in reliance thereon, and
it could be invalidated only at the cost of major readjustments and extensive litigation. (Helvering v. Griffiths, 318
U.S. 371, 403 [63 S.Ct. 636, 87 L.Ed. 843]; United States v.
Hill, 120 U.S. 169, 182 [7 S.Ct. 510, 30 L.Ed. 627] ; see County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 707, 712 [112 P.
2d 10]; Hoyt v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners, 21
Cal.2d 399, 402 [132 P.2d 804].) Whatever the force' of
administrative construction, however, final responsibility for
the interpretation of the law rests with the courts. "At most
administrative practice is a weight in the scale, to be considered but not to be inevitably followed .... While we are
of course bound to weigh seriously such rulings, they are
never conclusive." (F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States,
91 F.2d 973, 976.) [2] An administrative officer may not
make a rule or regulation that alters or enlarges the terms
of a legislative enactment. (California Drive-In Restaurant
Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R.
1028] ; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 17
Ca1.2d 321, 326 [109 P.2d 935]; Boone v. Kingsbury, 206
Cal. 148, 161 [273 P. 797] ; Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal.
1, 21 [251 P. 784] ; Hodge v. McCall, 185 Cal. 330, 334 [197
P. 86] ; Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner
of Int. Rev., 297 U.S. 129 [56 KCt. 397, 80 L.Ed. 528] ; Montgomery v. Board of Administration, 34 Cal.App.2d 514, 521
[93 P.2d 1046,94 A.L.R. 610].) [3] Moreover, an erroneous
administrative construction does not govern the interpretation
of a statute, even though the statute is subsequently reenacted
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without change. (Biddle v. Oommissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 U.S. 573, 582 [58 S.Ct. 379, 82 L.Ed. 431] ; Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 [24 S.Ot. 590, 48 L.Ed. 888] ; Iselin
v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 [46 S.Ot. 248, 70 L.Ed.
566] ; Lo'uisville (0 N. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740,
757 [G1 S.Ot. 207, 75 L.Ed. 672] ; P. W. Woolworth 00. v.
United 8tntcs, !Jl F.2d 973, 976; Pacfic Greyhound Lines v.
Johnson, 54 Cal.App.2d 297, 303 [129 P.2d 32] ; see Helvering v. Wilshire Oil 00., 308 U.S. 90, 100 [60 S.Ot. 18, 84
L.Ed. 101] ; Hclvering v Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 [60 S.Ct.
44'.l:, 84 L.Ed. 604, 125 A.L.R. 1368] ; Federal Oomm. Oom. V.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U.S. 132, 137 [61 S.Ot.
152, 85 L.Ed. 87] ; Feller, Addendum to the RegUlations Problem, 54 Hurv.L.Rev. 1311, and articles there cited.)
In the present case Rule 56.1 was first adopted by the commission in 1938. It was amended twice to make minor changes
in language, and again in 1942 to extend the maximum period
of disqualification to six weeks. The commission's construction
of section 56 (b) has thus heen neither uniform nor of long
standing. Moreover, the section is not ambiguous, nor does
it fail to indicate the extent of the disqualification. [4] The
disqualification imposed upon a claimant who without good
cause "has refused to accept suitable employment when
offered to him, or failed to apply for suitable employment
when notified by the district public employment office" is an
absolute disqualification that necessarily extends throughout
the period of his unemployment entailed by his refusal to
accept suitable employment, and is terminated only by his
subsequent employment. (Accord: 5 C.C.H. Unemployment
Insurance Service 35,100, par. 1965.04 [N.Y.App.Bd.Dec.
830-39, 5/27/39].) The Unemployment Insurance Act was
expressly intended to establish a system of unemployment insurance to provide benefits for "persons unemployed through
no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment . . . . " (Stats. 1939, eh. 564, § 2; Deering's Gen. Laws,
1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 1.) The public policy of the State
as thus declared by the J..Jegislature was intended as a guide
to the interpretation and applieation of the act. (Ibid.)
[5] One who refuses suitable employment without good cause
is not involuntarily unemployed through no fault of his own.
He has no claim to benefits either at the time of his refusal or
at any subsequent time ulltil he again brings himself within
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the provisions 6f the statute. (See 1 C.C.H. Unemployment
Insurance Service 869, par. 1963.) Section 56 (b) in excluding
absolutely from benefits those who without good cause have
demonstrated an unwillingness to work at suitable employment stands out in contrast to other sections of the act that
impose limited disqualifications. Thus, section 56 (a) disqualifies a person who leaves his work because of a trade dispute
for the period during which he continues ont of work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active progress
in th:o establishment in which he was employed; and other sections at the time in question disqualified for a fixed number
of weeks persons discharged for misconduct, persons who left
their work voluntarily, and those who made wilful misstatements. (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 8780(d), §§ 56(a),
55, 58(e); see, also, Stats. 1939, ch. 674, § 14; Deering's Gen.
Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 58.) Had the Legislature intended the disqualification imposed by section 56 (b) to be similarly limited, it would have expressly so provided. [6] Rule
56.1, which attempts to create such a limitation by an administrative ruling, conflicts with the statute and is void. (Hodge
v. MeOall, supra; Manhattan General Equipment CO. V. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 297 U.S. 129, 134 [56 S.Ot. 397, 80
L.Ed. 528] ; see Bodinson Mfg. 00. v. California Employment
Oom., 17 Ca1.2d 321, 326 [109 P.2d 935].) Even if the failure
to limit the disqualification were an oversight on the part of
the Legislature, the commission would have no power to rem·
edy the omission. [7] The power given it to adopt rules and
regulations (§ 90) is not a grant of legislative power (see 40
Columbo L. Rev. 252; cf. Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp.,
Act 8780 (d), § 58 (b)) and in promulgating such rules it may
not alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope.
(Hodge V. McCall, supra; Bank of Italy V. Johnson, 200 Cal.
1, 21 [2G1 P. 784]; Manhattan General Equipment CO. V.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., supra; Koshland V. Helvering, 298
U.S. 441 [56 S.Ot. 767, 80 L.Ed. 1268, 105 A.L.R. 756];
Iselin V. United States, supra.) Since the commission was
without power to adopt Rule 56.1, it is unnecessary to consider
whether, if given such power, the provisions of the rule were
reasonable.
The commission contends, however, that petitioners are
not entitled· to the writ because they have failed to exhaust
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their administrative remedies under section 41.1. This contention was decided adversely in Matson Terminals, Inc. v.
California Employment Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202].
It contends further that since all the benefits herein involved
have been paid, the only question is whether the charges
made to the employers' accounts should be removed, and that
since the employers will have the opportunity to protest these
charges in other proceedings, they have an adequate remedy
and there is therefore no need for the issuance of the writ
in the present case. The propriety of the payment of benefits, however, is properly challenged by an employer in proceedings under section 67 and by a petition for a writ of
mandamus from the determination of the commission in such
proceedings. (See Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employment Com., ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202]; W. R. Grace
((; Co. v. California Employment Com., ante, p. 720 [151
P.2d 215].) An employer's remedy thereunder is distinct
from that afforded by section 45.10 and 41.1, and the commission may not deprive him of it by the expedient of paying
the benefits before the writ is obtained. [8] The statute itself
provides that in certain cases payment shall be made irrespective of a subsequent appeal (§ 67) and such payment
does not preclude issuance of the writ. (See Bodinson Mfg.
Co. v. California Emp. Com., supra, at pp. 330-331; Matson
Terminals, Inc. v. Califoc-nia Emp. Com., supra.)
Let a peremptory writ of mandamus issue ordering the
California Employment Commission to set aside its order
granting unemployment insurance benefits to the corespondents, and to refrain from charging petitioners' accounts with
any benefits paid pursuant to that award.
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion for the reason stated in my concurring
opinion in Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Emp. Co., this
day filed, ante, p. 752 [151 P.2d 233].
Schauer, J., concurred.
Intervener's petition for a rehearing was denied Septem.
ber 13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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ROGER AVERILL et al., Respondents, v. WALTER
GOULD LINCOLN et aI., Appellants.
(Two Cases.)
[1] Appeal-Record-Alternative Method-Effect of Delay-Termination of Proceedings.-The old practice of a motion in the
trial court to terminate the proceedings for a record on appeal
has disappeared as a result of the changes made hy the new
Rules on Appeal. (Rules 4-7, 45(h), 45(c), 53(b).) If the
specified time and allowable extensions have elapsed, the appeal will be dismissed by the appellate court under rule 10(a)
unless that court grants relief.
'
[2] Id. - Record - Objections - Relief from Default.-The d~c
laration of rule 40(d) of Rules on Appeal that the word "shall,"
when used in the rules, is mandatory, merely states a required
act and means that the particular provision does not permit
of alternative or permissive procedures; it does not preclude
a reviewing court, which ohtained jurisdiction by the filing of
a timely notice of appeal, from granting relief from a default
occasioned by violation of a procedural' requirement as to the
record on appeal.
[3] Id. - Record-Settled Statement-Relief from Default.-Appellants who filed a written notice of their election to proceed
on a settled statement, but who neglected to serve said notice
on respondents within the ten-day period prescrihed by rule
7(b) of Rules on Appeal, should, pursuant to rule 53(b),be
relieved from default in violating said,procedural requirement,
where a copy of the proposed statement, served on respondents 12 days before the filing of their notice to strike said
statement, contained a copy of the notice of election, and
where respondents made no showing of injury resulting from
the failure timely to serve the notice on them.
[4] Id.-Record-Settled Statement-Relief from Default.-If a
proposed settled statement and proposed amendments are presented to a judge who is not familiar with the trial proceedings, he may require appellant to furnish a transcript to aid
in the settlement of the statement. If the appellant furnishes
[3] See 2 Cal.Jur. 489.
McK. Dig. References: [2] Appeal and Error, §§ 775, 820.1;
[3-5] Appeal and Error, § 646.20.

